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We  develop  hypotheses  concerning  the  impact  of  multinational  firms’ 
international plant networks and host country foreign investor agglomeration on 
the divestment of manufacturing affiliates, drawing on real option theory and 
location and agglomeration theory. We test our hypotheses on a comprehensive 
sample of 1078 Asian manufacturing affiliates of Japanese multinational firms 
in  the  electronics  industry  during  the  turbulent  years  preceding  and  into  the 
Asian financial crisis (1995-1998). We find evidence that multinational firms 
both maintain flexibility options by operating a network of platform affiliates in 
multiple  Asian  countries,  and  exercise  these  flexibility  options  through 
divestments of affiliates that do not add flexibility value. Affiliates of which the 
location  decision  at  entry  was  dominated  by  the  local  presence  of  Japanese 
investor agglomeration or buyer-supplier agglomeration within vertical business 
groups  have  higher  divestment  rates,  suggesting  that  agglomeration  leads  to 
‘adverse selection’ of affiliates with weaker competitiveness.  
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The  expanding  literature  on  multinational  firms  has  devoted  substantial  attention  to  strategic 
issues related to their foreign expansion, such as the firm-level determinants of international expansion 
(Belderbos and Sleuwaegen, 1996; Kogut and Chang, 1991; 1996; Guillen, 2002), the choice of entry 
mode abroad (e.g. Delios and Beamish, 1999b; Hennart, 1991; Barkema and Vermeulen, 1999), the choice 
of location of new affiliates (Head et al., 1995; Shaver and Flyer, 2000), and the impact of multinational 
expansion and geographic scope on overall firm performance (Delios and Beamish, 1999a; Hitt et al, 
1997;  Tallman  and  Li,  1996).  These  empirical  studies  have  been  based  on  an  abundance  of,  mostly 
complementary, theories of multinational enterprise and foreign investment drawing on transaction costs 
theory  (e.g.  Caves,  1998,  Dunning,  1993;  Hennart,  1988),  the  theory  of  oligopolistic  interaction 
(Knickerbocker, 1973), location and agglomeration theory (Chung and Kalnins, 2001, Krugman, 1991, 
Chung  and  Alcacer,  2002),  the  resourced  based  theory  of  the  firm  (e.g.  Chang,  1995),  process  and 
organizational learning theory (Johansson and Vahlne 1977; Kogut and Zander, 1995), and the theory of 
real options (Kogut and Kulatilaka, 1994a, 1994b).
1  
Comparatively little attention has been paid to multinational firms’ decisions to withdraw from 
foreign operations, i.e. foreign divestment. Previous studies have examined the implications of several 
streams of foreign investment theory for divestments and uncovered a number of factors systematically 
affecting the survival of foreign affiliates, such as the mode of entry (Li, 1995; McCloughan and Stone, 
1998; Shaver, 1998), size and experience of the affiliate (Benito, 1997; Shaver et al, 1997; Zaheer and 
Mosakowski, 1997), the market focus of the affiliate (Chen and Wu, 1996; Pan and Chi, 1999), the extent 
of diversification of entry (Li, 1995), parent experience gained through previous international expansion 
(Li, 1995; Shaver et al, 1997; Delios and Beamish, 2001), human capital and technology advantages (Mata 
and Portugal, 2000; Delios and Beamish, 2001; Belderbos, 2003) and affiliate capabilities related to local 
embeddedness (Song, 2002). A limitation of most of these studies is that they examined the determinants 
                                                 
1 See also Belderbos and Sleuwaegen (2005) for an overview.   4 
of survival and divestment of foreign affiliates in a single country setting, e.g. in the US (Li, 1995; Shaver, 
1998; Shaver et al, 1997), Portugal (Mata and Portugal, 2000; 2002), Taiwan (Chen and Wu, 1996), 
Ireland (McCloughan and Stone, 1998), Belgium (Pennings and Sleuwaegen, 2000), Japan (Yamawaki, 
1999) and China (Pan and Chin, 1999). Partly as a result, previous studies have largely ignored the 
potential impact of the role of the affiliate in the larger international plant network of the multinational 
firm.
 2 Real option theory conceptualizes how operating a network of manufacturing plants in different 
countries  can  create  value  for  the  multinational  firm  by  providing  options  of  manufacturing  location 
flexibility under uncertainty. Affiliates could play the vital role of a country platform investment (Kogut 
and Kulatilaka, 1994b) providing future expansion options, but at the same time affiliates may face greater 
odds of divestment in case of international relocation of manufacturing operations to other affiliates in the 
network. Real option theory has been applied to explain sequential investments by parent firms (Kogut 
and  Chang,  1996),  the  formation  of  multinational  networks  as  a  competitive  advantage  (Kogut  and 
Kulatilaka, 1994a; Tang and Tikoo, 1999), and entry mode decisions (Kouvelis, et al., 2001; Kogut, 1991) 
but the implications for divestment decisions have not been examined.
3  
A  second  relative  discrepancy  between  foreign  investment  theories  and  divestment  studies 
concerns the role of foreign investor agglomeration. Foreign investor agglomeration may benefit affiliates 
in a country due to potential knowledge spillovers, externalities in the provision of specialized business 
services and intermediate inputs, or positive demand effects (e.g. Chung and Kalnins, 2001; Wheeler and 
Mody,  1992).  Empirical  studies  of  location  decisions  by  multinational  firms  have  provided  strong 
confirmation of the positive impact of agglomeration on location choice (e.g. Chang and Park, 2005; 
Smith and Florida, 1994; Head and Ries, 1996; Head et al., 1995). Empirical studies of the effects of 
agglomeration on firm performance have however generally not been able to confirm an expected positive 
impact (e.g. Appold, 1995; Baum and Mezias, 1992; Chung, 2001). This has been attributed to the greater 
competition between firms in agglomerated areas to attract customers or to secure quality inputs (e.g. 
skilled  labor),  which  may  lead  to  increased  price  competition  and  higher  input  costs.  An  alternative 
explanation for a negative correlation between agglomeration and firm performance is that agglomerations 
are more attractive to firms with lower long-term survival chances, in a process termed ‘adverse selection’ 
(Shaver and Flyer, 2000). This notion has received indirect support in empirical studies of location choice 
that found important heterogeneities in firms’ responses to agglomeration depending on investing firms’ 
characteristics (Belderbos and Carree, 2002; Delios and Henisz, 2000; Chung and Song, 2004; Nachum 
                                                 
2 Studies that did examine divestments in multiple countries, e.g. Benito (1997) for Norwegian firms, Belderbos 
(2003) for Japanese firms in Europe, Park and Park (2000) for Korean firms, and Song (2002) for Japanese firms in 
Asia (1988-1994) did not examine the impact of multinational operations from a real options perspective. 
3 An exception is Pennings and Sleuwaegen (2000), analysing plant closures and plant relocations by domestic and 
foreign owned firms in Belgium.   5 
and  Wymbs,  2005),  with  smaller,  less  experienced,  or  less  resource  rich  firms  more  attracted  to 
agglomerated areas. The implications of these complex impacts of agglomeration for firm survival have 
not been investigated in detail.  
In this paper we develop hypotheses concerning the impact of multinational firms’ international 
plant networks and host countries’ foreign investor agglomeration on the probability of divestment of 
manufacturing affiliates, drawing on real option theory and the theory of agglomeration and location 
choice. The importance of these theoretical insights has been explored in the context of international 
expansion  by  multinational  firms,  but  is  yet  to  be  examined  adequately  in  the  context  of  foreign 
divestments.
4 We  explicitly  take  into  account  that  foreign  affiliates  are  often  part  of  an  intra-firm 
multinational  network  of  affiliates,  and  that  they  can  have  inter-firm  ties  with  other  local  affiliates 
belonging  to  the  same  vertical  business  group.  We  examine  the  complex  role  of  agglomeration  and 
specifically address the impact of adverse selection in a two-step methodology, calculating a measure of 
adverse selection from the estimated responsiveness of affiliates to agglomeration as obtained from a first-
step location decision model. We test our hypotheses on a large sample of 1078 manufacturing affiliates 
operated in nine Asian countries by Japanese electronics multinationals during the years preceding and 
into the Asian financial crisis (1995-1998). This is an interesting setting for our analysis from several 
perspectives.  Multinational  firms  operating  in  Asia  in  these  years  faced  great  uncertainty  concerning 
exchange rates, inflation, and economic recovery and demand in different Asian countries. This increased 
the option value of operating a network in various countries, while at the same time divergence in labor 
costs developments pushed firms to use their networks for international relocation. The plant location 
choices of Japanese firms have furthermore been found to be particularly responsive to agglomerations of 
other  Japanese-owned  plants  abroad,  in  particular  if  the  investing  firms  are  suppliers  within  vertical 
business groups that follow the leading assembler abroad (e.g. Belderbos and Sleuwaegen, 1996; Head et 
al. 1995; Martin et al. 1995;1998; Delios and Henisz, 2003; Chung and Song, 2004). 
 
 
LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Literature Review 
Studies on survival of foreign affiliates drew their early inspiration from industrial organization 
theory  on  industry  and  firm  dynamics,  dealing  with  firm  entry,  exit,  and  post-entry  performance. 
Theoretically, Jovanovic (1982) modeled the expansion of firm as an adaptive learning process. He argued 
                                                 
4 In this, we follow the suggestion of Boddewyn (1983) that any theory of divestment should consider the conceived 
determinants of foreign investments.   6 
that firms learn about their efficiency only gradually and, under uncertainty, tend to enter with a relative 
small size. Successful firms subsequently increase their size incrementally as their efficiency reveals itself, 
and unsuccessful firms exit at an early age when they are still small. His model predicts that, at a given 
point in time, larger firms and older firms are more likely to have been growing successfully in the past 
and hence have a higher probability of survival, compared with their smaller and younger counterparts. 
Evidence in support of this prediction has been found in several empirical studies: e.g. Evans (1987) found 
that the probability of firm survival increases with firm size and firm age, and Dunne et al (1988) found 
that small and younger firms have the highest rate of failure.
5 The relationships between establishment 
size, age and the probability of survival have also been tested in the context of foreign owned affiliates. Li 
(1995) found a positive relationship between affiliates’ size and survival rate for foreign owned affiliates 
in the US, Yamawaki (1999) for foreign owned affiliates in Japan, Chen and Wu (1996) for foreign 
subsidiaries in Taiwan, and Belderbos (2003) for Japanese affiliates in Europe. The relationship between 
foreign affiliate age and survival, however, appears substantially more complex. On the one hand, earlier 
evidence supports a positive relationship between firm age and firm or affiliate survival (e.g. Mitchell, 
1994; Mata and Portugal, 1994; Yamawaki, 1999; Benito, 1997; Shaver et al, 1997). On the other hand, Li 
(1995)  and  Hennart  et  al  (1998)  found  the  exit  rate  to  be  particularly  low  in  the  first  years  after 
establishment. This suggests the presence of a “honeymoon” effect: firms give affiliates, even if they are 
not performing well, a number of years to prove their success. Mata and Portugal (2002), analyzing 
foreign owned firms in Portugal, found evidence of a “liability of adolescence”: exit rates increased for 
older affiliates, suggesting that there is increasing organizational rigidity or obsolescence of organizational 
resources as new establishments age (cf. Hannan, 1998).  
The international business literature has further focused on the determinants of survival of foreign 
affiliates specifically, drawing on a number of theories. Theories of foreign direct investment (e.g. Caves, 
1996;  Dunning,  1993)  posit  that  firms  entering  foreign  markets  face  much  higher  information  and 
adaptation costs and are put in an inferior position through their “liability of foreigness” vis-à-vis local 
firms.  Hence,  foreign  entrants  require  a  compensating  competitive  advantage,  often  based  on  the 
possession of intangible assets that can be transferred and exploited abroad, in order to survive (e.g. 
Buckley  and  Casson,  1976).  A  number  of  empirical  studies  have  confirmed  a  positive  impact  of 
technology, advertising, or human capital intensity on foreign affiliate survival (e.g. Delios and Beamish, 
2001; Mata and Portugal, 2000; Belderbos, 2003).  
A  complementary  view  on  foreign  direct  investment,  the  process  or  “stage”  theory  of 
internationalization,  suggests  that  firms  tend  to  circumvent  the  “liability  of  foreigness”  problem  by 
following an incremental pattern of foreign market involvement (Johanson and Valhne, 1977). Firms build 
                                                 
5 See also Caves (1998) for an overview of this literature.   7 
up  internationalization  experience  through  acquiring  foreign  market  knowledge  from  previous 
involvement,  enhancing  the  capability  to  efficiently  exploit  their  intangible  assets  on  (more  distant) 
foreign markets (Kogut and Zander, 1995), and reducing the probability of foreign affiliate failure. Chang 
(1995) found evidence that Japanese firms follow a sequential pattern for their entries into U.S. markets, 
with first entries focusing on core, competitive, product lines and subsequent entries focusing on non-core 
business. Li (1995) and Barkema et al. (1996) found that subsequent entries of multinational firms were 
less likely to exit than first time entries. Delios and Beamish (2001) showed that host country experience 
of the investing parent not only increases survival probability, but also enhances the profitability of the 
affiliates by allowing a more efficient exploitation of intangible assets in the foreign market. Shaver et al. 
(1997) extended the argument on experience effects by suggesting that firms can also learn from other 
firms’ host country experience, by examining what previous entry strategies have worked or failed. They 
found a positive relationship between the survival of foreign affiliates and the experience of other foreign 
affiliates in US industries. Kim and Delios (2003) highlighted a duality of host country experience for 
investing firms: experience allows for learning and positively impacts survival of subsequent entries, but 
can also lead to organizational inertia if previous experience is largely irrelevant to the subsequent entries. 
An  expanding  literature  in  international  business  has  examined  the  entry  mode  decisions  for 
foreign operations and the impact of entry mode on affiliate survival, with a focus on the longevity and 
stability of international joint-ventures (Gomes-Casseres, 1987; Kogut, 1991). Most findings suggest that 
foreign joint venture have a systematically higher probability of exit than wholly owned greenfield entries 
(e.g. Li, 1995; Yamawaki, 1997; Hennart et al, 1998; Kim and Delios, 2003).
6 This has been related to 
failure to deal with management conflicts and cultural differences, but also to a learning perspective of 
joint ventures: foreign firms may withdraw from a joint venture and expand their wholly owned operations 
in the country once they have gained sufficient experience through the joint venture (Kogut,1991; Yan and 
Zeng, 1999; Inkpen and Beamish, 1997). Hennart et al. (1998) indeed suggest that the higher termination 
rate of joint ventures is predominantly explained by a higher probability of selling the equity stake, instead 
of by a greater probability of liquidation. Dhanaraj and Beamish (2004) provide a more fine-grained 
analysis of the role of equity ownership in the dissolution of foreign affiliates and found that minority 
stakes  are  associated  with  divestment,  but  not  majority  stakes.  Besides  entry  through  joint  ventures, 
acquired affiliates also appear to exhibit higher divestment probabilities, which has been attributed to 
difficulties related to post-acquisition integration (Li, 1995; Shaver et al, 1998; McCloughan and Stone, 
1998; Mata and Portugal, 2000).  
                                                 
6 Although other studies (e.g. Benito, 1997; Pan and Chi, 1999) have not found a differential rate of survival between 
the two types of foreign establishments.    8 
Other strategic variables that have been suggested to impact foreign affiliate survival are the 
degree of diversification and the market orientation of the firm. Diversified affiliates are more likely to 
fail, mainly due to the fact that investing firms have to deal at the same time with unfamiliar markets and 
unfamiliar products (Benito, 1997; Li, 1995; Yamawaki, 1997). With regard to the market orientation of 
the firm, it has been suggested that export oriented foreign affiliates are more footloose because they are 
established by their parent firms to arbitrage the factor cost differentials across production locations. This 
makes the affiliates more sensitive to changes in cost conditions (Caves, 1996), or less embedded in the 
local economy in terms of supplier and other linkages (Belderbos et al, 2001; Song, 2002). Chen and Wu 
(1996),  in  a  study  of  foreign  investment  projects  in  Taiwan,  related  the  proportion  of  affiliate  sales 
generated from export to the survival of the affiliate, and confirmed that affiliates with higher export 
proportion are more likely to withdraw. Pan and Chi (1999), on the other hand, found no find evidence for 
a systematic impact of market focus of foreign affiliates’ survival and financial performance in a study of 





  Two issues that have not received due attention in the divestment literature but have been found 
relevant for FDI decisions are the real options perspective on FDI and manufacturing networks, and the 
role of agglomeration in location decisions by multinational firms. 
Most of the literature on foreign affiliate survival implicitly associates exit with the failure of the 
foreign affiliate. However, exit may be due to reasons other than affiliate failure, and poor performance is 
only  one  of  the  identified  factors  of  foreign  divestment  (Boddewyn,  1979).  The  literature  on 
multinationality and firm performance emphasizes that multinational firms can achieve lower operational 
costs by adapting manufacturing plant networks to changing cost and demand conditions in multiple 
countries (Grant, 1987; Gomes and Ramaswamy, 1999; Tang and Tikoo, 1999). Firms will locate and 
relocate manufacturing plants in response to relative cost and demand conditions, comparing alternative 
manufacturing locations. Hence, it is relative profitability and efficiency rather than affiliate performance 
per se that may cause the relocation of manufacturing and ultimately a divestment decision.  
In this context, real option theory offers a way to conceptualize how dispersed manufacturing 
plants add value to the firm. Under the condition of uncertainty concerning future relative cost and market 
conditions in host countries, the ability to shift manufacturing operations quickly between locations in 
response  to  changing  cost  differentials  can  provide  an  important  competitive  advantage.  Kogut  and 
Kulatilaka (1994a) theoretically showed that the option value of this flexibility could be substantial when   9 
there  is  high  uncertainty  concerning  demand  or  manufacturing  cost  differentials.  Multinational  firms 
therefore can benefit from keeping options of future manufacturing expansion open in various countries 
with potentially divergent macroeconomic developments. They create these options by operating local 
manufacturing affiliates, which serve as potential platforms for future expansion (Kogut and Chang, 1996). 
Kogut and Kulatilaka (1994b) coin these manufacturing affiliates ‘country platforms’. Operating these 
platforms  allows  firms  to  capitalize  on  country-specific  investments  they  made  in  developing  local 
operational know-how and relationships with local suppliers and customers, and government institutions 
(Song, 2002; Belderbos et al, 2001) to facilitate swift and effective expansion.  
As a corollary, under uncertainty concerning future economic circumstances, the option value of 
the platform also creates investment ‘hysteresis’: firms are reluctant to divest the platform even under 
adverse circumstances, as divestments eliminate the option of effective future expansion. This reduction in 
option value in case of divestment occurs if the manufacturing affiliate effectively serves as a country 
platform: i.e. it is the only manufacturing affiliate in the country operated by the firm. In contrast, if an 
affiliate is one among multiple manufacturing affiliates in a country, divestment of an individual affiliate 
does not affect future expansion and network flexibility options. Hence, the following hypothesis follows 
under conditions of uncertainty: 
 
Hypothesis 1: a foreign affiliate that is the only manufacturing affiliate of the parent firm in a country (an 
affiliate serving as ‘country platform’) has a lower probability of divestment. 
 
The previous arguments suggested that multinational firms derive value from creating network 
flexibility options by maintaining a network of country platforms. At the same time, firms will only derive 
value from network flexibility if they indeed can exercise flexibility options in response to temporary 
shocks in local environments. If not, there would be no benefit in operating a network from a flexibility 
perspective under longer term uncertainty. Kogut and Kulatilaka (1994a) show how firms can exercise 
flexibility options by changing capacity loadings of affiliates in different countries rapidly in response to 
cost and demand changes. In order to preserve the flexibility value of the network, firms will not divest 
manufacturing operations in a country as long as uncertainty remains concerning future cost and demand 
conditions.  
In the stylized representation of Kogut and Kulatilaka (1994a), the multinational firm operates one 
single  plant  in  each  country.  In  practice  however,  multinational  firms  can  and  do  operate  multiple 
manufacturing affiliates in the various countries in which they are active. In the context of multiple plants 
operated by multinational firms in the same country, the exercise of flexibility options is not necessarily 
limited to changes in capacity loadings, but can also involve closure and relocation of entire production   10 
lines and manufacturing affiliates. Although firms will wish to preserve flexibility options by refraining 
from divesting manufacturing affiliates that serve as country platforms, firms can implement adjustments 
in  their  international  manufacturing  configuration  without  affecting  flexibility  value  by  closing 
manufacturing affiliates that do not serve as country platforms. Closure of one of multiple manufacturing 
affiliates in a country will not substantially reduce the firm’s ability to shift back production quickly to the 
country if investment conditions improve again, as the firm maintains one or more manufacturing bases in 
the  country.  This  implies  that  the  exercise  of  network  flexibility  options  can  involve  divestment  of 
manufacturing affiliates, but only if these affiliates do not serve as country platforms.  
The exercise of plant network flexibility options involving affiliate divestments is more likely to 
occur, the greater the number of country platforms the multinational firm operates and hence the larger the 
potential number of relocation options that can become opportune due to a possible divergence in cost and 
demand conditions between countries. In contrast, multinational firms that only operate affiliates in one or 
a limited number of countries have fewer effective relocation opportunities and their affiliates are less 
likely to be divested due to the exercise of network flexibility options. Hence, the larger the network of 
country platforms operated by the firm, the greater the likelihood that a non-platform affiliate is divested, 
but this pattern is not predicted for affiliates that serve as country platforms themselves. This leads to the 
following hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis  2:  The  probability  of  divestment  of  a foreign  manufacturing  affiliate that  is not the only 
manufacturing affiliate operated by the parent in a country (an affiliate that does not serve as ‘country 
platform’) is higher the larger the network of country platforms operated by the parent firm. 
 
  It has long been suggested (Marshall, 1922) that firms can enjoy positive externalities stemming 
from geographic industry clustering. These can occur on the input side, as increased demand for inputs 
stimulates the provision of specialized (labor) inputs and specialized business services. Externalities may 
also occur on the demand side, as co-location of firms lowers search costs for customers and so heightens 
local  industry  demand,  or  through  locally  bounded  spillovers  of  technological  and  organizational 
knowledge. These possible externalities motivate firms to choose locations where similar establishments 
are clustered, an intuition which has been supported by formal economic models (Krugman, 1991; David 
and Rosenbloom, 1990). A substantial collection of empirical studies of plant location decisions have 
confirmed that industry clusters in countries or regions attract plant establishments by both domestic firms 
and foreign investors.
7  
                                                 
7 E.g. Carlton (1983), Bartik (1985), Wheeler and Mody (1992), Head et al, (1995), Head and Ries (1996), Belderbos 
and Carree (2002), Shaver and Flyer (2000), Delios and Henisz (2000).    11 
Agglomeration  effects  have  been  found  to  be  particularly  strong  in  the  case  of  Japanese 
multinational firms' foreign investment decisions (e.g. Head et al., 1995; Mayer and Muchielli, 1998). 
Japanese firms are much more likely to choose those foreign locations for their manufacturing activities 
where  other  Japanese  investors  have  established  affiliates  before,  even  after  controlling  for  general 
industry clustering effects (e.g. Belderbos and Carree, 2002; Head et al., 1995; Chung and Song, 2004). 
This particular responsiveness of Japanese firms to agglomerations of establishments of other Japanese 
firms has been attributed to the presence of greater externalities associated with co-location. These are due 
to the ease of communication and information exchange between Japanese companies and to the use of 
similar inputs such as the shared use of ‘national’ amenities (e.g. Japanese schools), the use of similar 
labor  training  systems  and  labor  pools,  common  reliance  on  just-in-time  (JIT)  delivery  systems  that 
require close spatial concentration of manufacturing plants and strict production flow control by suppliers, 
and quality control requirements that can be satisfied more easily by Japanese firms with experience in 
total quality management (e.g. Smith and Florida, 1994; Belderbos and Carree, 2002; Head et al., 1995). 
The  presence  of  externalities  related  to  industry  clustering  is  consistent  with  the  notion  that 
industry clusters enhance the overall competitiveness of the location as well as the competitiveness of the 
population of firms (Porter, 1990). However, empirical findings on the impact of industry or foreign 
investor agglomeration on the performance of individual firms have not generally provided evidence of a 
positive  relationship.  In  a  study  of  the  US  metal  working  sector,  Appold  (1995)  found  a  negative 
correlation between industry clustering and firm performance. Baum and Mezias (1992), analyzing the 
Manhattan hotel industry, found that geographically localized competition increased failure rates. Zaheer 
and Mosakowski (1997) found an inverted-U shape relationship between survival and the number of 
competitors in host countries’ financial service industries. Kim and Delios (2003) found that geographic 
proximity to other Japanese affiliates in the same industry negatively impacted Japanese affiliate survival 
in China. Shaver and Flyer (2000) found that industry agglomeration in US states was associated with a 
greater probability of exit of foreign affiliates. Chung (2001), in a longitudinal analysis of foreign affiliate 
performance, found that foreign establishments that located more remote from existing industry clusters 
performed better in terms of price cost margins than firms locating within local clusters. Chung and 
Kalnins (2001) found a positive demand enhancing effects of clusters of large hotels on other hotels’ 
performance in the Texas hotel industry, but at the same time a negative impact of the presence of hotels 
operating in a similar market segments. A common explanation for these findings is that geographic 
proximity has a detrimental effect that may outweigh agglomeration benefits: proximity increases the 
intensity of competition on output markets, reducing output prices, and may also increase competition on   12 
factor markets, driving up factor prices (e.g. Chung and Kalnins, 2001; Kim and Delios, 2003).
8  
An alternative explanation for a negative correlation between agglomeration and individual firm 
performance is suggested by a number of recent studies that emphasize that the attractiveness and impact 
of industry agglomeration differs depending on the characteristics of the investing firm. In other words, 
firms are heterogeneous in their response to agglomeration and the potential advantages or disadvantages 
associated with it. Chung and Alcacer (2002) examined the moderating impact of differences in R&D 
intensity between home and host countries on the tendency of foreign investors to locate in US states. 
They found that firms coming from countries with relatively low R&D intensities choose US states with 
high R&D intensities, suggesting that areas with a greater concentration of R&D intensive firms attract 
predominantly  knowledge  seeking  investments  by  technology  laggards.  Nachum  and  Wymbs  (2005) 
found evidence of heterogeneity in the choice of the location of acquisition targets by professional service 
firms  in  London  and  New  York.  Firms  with  higher  levels  of  product  differentiation  chose  locations 
significantly  further  away  from  other  firms  in  the  same  service  industry  than  firms  with  a  less 
differentiated  service  portfolio.  Delios  and  Henisz  (2000)  found  that  Japanese  firms  without  much 
international  experience  were  more  likely  to  invest  in  countries  in  which  other  Japanese  firms  had 
previously invested. Chung and Song (2004) obtained similar results in an analysis of Japanese electronics 
firms’ location decisions in the US. Belderbos and Carree (2002) found that smaller firms’ location choice 
in China was significantly more responsive to Japanese investor agglomeration than the location choice by 
larger firms.  
Taken together, these studies provide evidence that agglomeration systematically attracts firms 
that may be competitively in a weaker position: smaller, less experienced, less technologically advanced 
and less able to differentiate products. The explanation for this pattern is relatively straightforward: large 
firms with the most innovative technologies, organizational and process skills, and the most differentiated 
products contribute the most to agglomeration externalities, but benefit relatively less. These firms have 
most  to  loose  from  knowledge  spillovers  within  the  industry  cluster,  skilled  employee  mobility, 
mimicking by local competitors of product designs and organizational approaches, all of which strengthen 
weaker local competitors. Smaller and less resource rich firms on the other hand, do not add much to the 
externalities in local clusters, but see important benefits from such externalities. Hence, agglomeration 
leads  to  ‘adverse  selection’:  a  selection  process  through  which  the  firms  with  relatively  weaker 
competitiveness are more likely to opt to locate within the cluster and the most competitive firms more 
likely to locate outside the cluster.  
                                                 
8 Sorenson  and  Audia  (2000)  found  that  geographic  clustering  in  the  shoe  industry  increased  failure  rates,  and 
attribute this to increased competition to attract labor.   13 
The relatively greater presence of firms with weaker competitiveness in industry agglomerations 
allows for a reconciliation of the presence of agglomeration externalities with the empirically observed 
greater incidence of firm exit within industry agglomerations, but the explanatory power of this adverse 
selection argument has not yet been investigated.
9 Adverse selection suggests that those firms for which 
the agglomeration factor was dominant in the location choice decision at the time of entry because they 
expected important net benefits from agglomeration, are less likely to possess substantial competitive 
resources of their own. Among those firms, a relatively large proportion may be less likely to sustain a 
sufficient level of competitiveness in the years subsequent to entry, as firms lack the capabilities to adapt 
to possible changes in the environment such as increased competition or cost increases. This implies that 
those firms that are most responsive to agglomeration in their location decisions are less likely to survive 
in the longer term. In the context of foreign investments by Japanese firms, the observed importance of 
previous Japanese investments for location choices suggests that adverse selection arises through Japanese 
investor agglomeration. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis  3:  Japanese  manufacturing  affiliates  of  which  the  location  choice  at  entry  was  more 
responsive to Japanese investor agglomeration have a higher probability of divestment. 
 
The attraction of foreign investor agglomeration has been found to be particularly pronounced for 
Japanese firms belonging to vertical business groups (vertical keiretsu), centered around large ’core’ firms 
in the automobile and electronics industry such as Toyota or Toshiba. Several empirical studies have 
confirmed that the presence of group affiliates in a location has a substantial and significant positive effect 
on  location  choice  probabilities  for  group  firms,  on  top  of  the  impact  of  general  Japanese  affiliate 
agglomeration (Head et al., 1995; Smith and Florida, 1994; Dyer, 1996; Belderbos and Carree, 2002). 
Vertical keiretsu are characterized by intensive supplier-buyer linkages and intra-group trade where the 
suppliers are to a large extent dependent on trade with the core firm or other firms within the group. These 
supplier  buyer  relationships  are  often  accompanied  by  intensive  inter-firm  flows  of  information  and 
dedicated investments in design and production equipment by suppliers to serve the core firm. Vertical 
business groups have often replicated these supplier relationships abroad, with ‘core’ firm investments in a 
location followed by first and second tier supplier establishments (Martin et al. 1998; Martin et al. 1995; 
Head et al. 1995). The core firm may even provide initial assistance to member firms in the process of 
overseas  expansion  and  provides  assured  market  potential  for  locally  manufactured  output  of  the 
                                                 
9 Shaver and Flyer (2000) suggested, but did not explore, that a negative impact of agglomeration could be due to 
either more intense competition, or the greater attraction of agglomerated areas to firms with fewer managerial and 
technological resources.   14 
suppliers. Also, subcontractors that are for a large part of their sales dependent on core firm demand, often 
have no other option but to invest abroad in response to the international relocation of core firm plants.  
Under the above conditions, foreign investment decisions by member firms are not governed by 
firm-specific competitive advantages as theories of foreign direct investment suggest, but by the presence 
of intra-group trade linkages. Previous studies have provided evidence that member firms indeed invested 
abroad in the absence of competitive advantages based on R&D, human capital, and marketing skills, but 
instead  responded  to  plant  networks  of  the  vertical  group,  while  independent  firms  did  base  foreign 
expansion strategies on firm-specific advantages (Belderbos and Sleuwaegen, 1996). This suggests that 
another form of adverse selection arises if the presence of strong intra-group trade linkages related to local 
agglomerations of group affiliates leads member firms with weakly developed competitive resources to 
co-locate manufacturing affiliates. The future of these affiliates hinges primarily on the continuation of 
intra-group  trade  relationships,  as  these  firms’  capabilities  to  develop  and  manufacture  products  cost 
competitively  for  non-keiretsu  clients  are  more  limited.  Yet  these  linkages  are  not  guaranteed.  If 
technological developments and increased price competition lead core firms to substitute procurement of 
mass produced standard components for design-specific components produced intra-group, the survival 
chances  of  member  firm  manufacturing  affiliates  are  greatly  reduced.  Recent  evidence  suggests  that 
Japanese firms abroad have indeed gradually sourced more components from independent local firms that 
improved quality and relied more on standard parts procurement, partly as a response to increasing price 
competition from Asian firms.
10  
Summarizing,  firms  in  vertical  business  groups  can  overcome  barriers  to  foreign  expansion 
through the replication of supplier-buyer linkages within a local network of group manufacturing plants, 
and are therefore more likely to invest in the absence of competitive advantages on third markets. Hence, 
vertical business group agglomeration induces ‘adverse selection’ and this is most pronounced for firms 
that base their investment decision primarily on business group agglomeration. Affiliates that are most 




Hypothesis  4:  Japanese  manufacturing  affiliates  of  which  the  location  choice  at  entry  was  more 
responsive to vertical business group investor agglomeration have a higher probability of divestment. 
                                                 
10 This pattern is particularly visible in the electronics sector (Paprzycki, 2005; Belderbos et al., 2001; Baba and 
Hatashima, 1995). 
11 We note that such agglomeration effects are much less a feature of horizontal keiretsu members’ investments 
abroad.  Henisz  and  Delios  (2001)  find  only  weak  influences  of  horizontal  keiretsu  membership  on  investment 
decisions and argue that potential impacts are due to imitative behaviour under uncertainty rather than agglomeration 
economies. In the industry setting of the current paper, the effect of horizontal groups spanning a wide array of 
industries is furthermore difficult to examine.    15 
 
DATA AND EMPIRICAL METHODS 
 
Data 
Our dataset consists of 1095 manufacturing affiliates operational in early 1995 that were wholly 
or  partially  controlled  by  412  Japanese  firms  in  the  broadly  defined  electronics  industry  in  9  Asian 
countries or regions, i.e. South Korea, Taiwan, China, Hong Kong, Singapore, Indonesia, Philippines, 
Malaysia, and Thailand. The data are compiled by the Research Institute of Electronic Industry as “Asia 
Shinshutsu Denshi Meika” (Survey of Japanese electronic firms in Asia) in Tokyo in 1995 and early 1999. 
It is an authoritative source on Japanese foreign investments in Asia in the electronics industry with 
complete coverage of investments by both large firms, small and medium sized firms, and specialized 
suppliers to the electronics industry (glass, plastic, metals, chemical materials).
12 The data give a reliable 
picture of investments by both leading electronics firms and smaller vertical business group-related or 
unrelated suppliers along the value chain of the electronics industry. The database contains information on 
the affiliates’ paid-in capital, number of employees, equity stake held by Japanese investors, direction of 
sales,  and  products  manufactured,  and  it  also  contains  parent  firm  information  on  sales,  number  of 
employees, paid-in capital, and recent developments in the firms’ overseas operations. We included in our 
analysis those manufacturing affiliates in which (Japanese) parent firms have an equity stake of at least 10 
percent. A divestment case was identified if we could confirm with certainty that a 1995 affiliate was 
either closed or its stake sold to a local or foreign firm by its parent within the 1995-1998 period.
13 The 
confirmation was given by the parent information provided for each Japanese firm on such decisions in 
the  1999  edition  of  the  survey,  combined  with  information  from  other  publications  by  the  Research 
Institute  of  Electronics  Industry  on  developments  in  Japanese  electronics  firms  (such  as  quarterly 
compilations of press releases), other sources on Japanese affiliates abroad (Toyo Keizai, 1999), and 
coverage in Japanese newspapers drawn from the Nikkei web news service. As a result, 99 out of 1095 
overseas manufacturing affiliates in operation in 1995 were identified as having been divested by early 
1999.  Since  for  17  affiliates  a  number  of  explanatory  variables  (primarily  parent  sales  and  affiliate 
employment) had missing values, our empirical analysis is performed on 1078 observations, out of which 
97 are divestment cases. 
The country distribution of the affiliates included in our analysis and the country distribution of 
divestments are presented in Table 1. China had the largest share of affiliates in our sample (22 percent), 
followed by Malaysia (21) and Taiwan (13). The distribution of divestments is rather different, with 
                                                 
12 The coverage is much broader, in particular for smaller and privately held firms, than the coverage of the often-
used directory compiled by Toyo Keizai Inc. (e.g. Delios and Beamish, 2001). 
13 In line with previous work, we examine all divestments.    16 
divestments mostly occurring (in terms of the share of divested affiliates) in the NIEs: Singapore (19 
percent), Hong Kong (16), and South Korea (14).  
 
Insert Table 1 
 
Model specification 
Our dependent variable is binary, taking the value 1 if a 1995 affiliate is divested prior to early 
1999 and 0 if it survived as a parent affiliate in the 1995-1998 period. We use a Probit model to relate the 
probability  of  divestment  to  the  explanatory  variables.  In  the  Probit  model  there  is  a  latent  variable 
measuring the likelihood of divestment of each affiliate (
*
i y ), which can be related to a set covariates. We 
observe divestment if this latent variable exceeds a certain threshold value (e.g. Greene, 1997). 
 















x y ε β β
 
 
We use a discrete choice model rather than a duration model. The main reason is that the exact 
year of the divestments could not be determined in all cases. While differentiating between the year of 
divestment would provide more variation in the dependent variable by specifying spells, given the four 
year time frame this advantage would be rather limited and the results would not be very different.
14 A 
potential problem with analysing divestment decisions in a fixed time frame is left censoring. We only 
observe  affiliates  that  have  survived  until  1995  and  not  those  that  were  divested  sometime  between 
establishment  and  the  year  1995.  We  believe  that  this  censoring  problem  is  not  likely  to  lead  to 
appreciable biases in our empirical results for two reasons. First, the evidence suggests that divestments 
were rather rare before 1995. The press release and newspaper screening on investments and divestments 
in Asia as well as earlier reports on foreign affiliates by the Research Institute of Electronics Industry did 
not result in more than a handful of divestments. Song (2002) also reports only few cases of divestments 
in his sample of Asian affiliates of Japanese electronics firms in 1988-1994. Second, in order to control for 
a possible bias due to left censoring, the model includes a flexible quadratic specification for affiliate age 
as a control variable. If censoring (early divestments before we are observing these) is occurring, it is most 
likely to occur for older affiliates rather than more recently established affiliates, since the performance of 
                                                 
14 Shaver and Flyer (2000) also report similar results of duration and probit models in their analysis of divestments 
by foreign affiliates in the US.   17 
older affiliates has been evaluated more frequently and over a longer period. The older affiliates that 
survived until 1995 are therefore more likely to have performed relatively well. This implies that age may 
pick  up  an  unobserved  type  of  competitiveness,  which  should  imply  a  negative  correlation  with 
divestment.  However,  the  empirical  results  described  below  show  the  opposite  effect  (divestment 





To test Hypothesis 1, we include a dummy variable (country platform affiliate), which takes the 
value 1 if the affiliate is the only manufacturing affiliate of its parent in the country in 1995, and 0 
otherwise. Hypothesis 1 predicts a negative impact on the probability of divestment, under the assumption 
of uncertainty concerning future investment conditions. In the empirical setting of our research, the latter 
assumption  clearly  holds.  Multinational  firms  faced  considerable  uncertainty  concerning  economic 
conditions in the region, in particular after the outbreak of the Asian financial crisis in the middle of 1997. 
In the most affected countries such as Thailand, Korea, and Indonesia, a collapse of the exchange rate was 
followed by a sharp rise in inflation rates and economic contraction. Neighboring economies, such as 
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Hong Kong were also affected, and it was uncertain to what extent these 
Asian countries would be able to regain macroeconomic and exchange rate stability accompanied by 
economic growth. Similarly, there was concern that China and Taiwan would not be able to neutralize the 
impact of the crisis on their economies. Table 2 illustrates these developments by providing a number of 
key indicators on economic developments in the nine Asian countries during 1995-1998. While real GDP 
growth was still positive over the period (with the exception of Thailand) partly due to rapid growth 
during 1995-1996, several countries experienced a large fall in the value of their currencies accompanied 
by a rapid rise in inflation. At the same time, the dollar value of local wages declined substantially in the 
most affected countries, increasing the cost competitiveness of these countries for manufacturing activities. 
Table 2 also shows an indicator of macroeconomic uncertainty relevant for foreign investment 
that has been used in the literature: the variance of the monthly real exchange rate of the local currency 
(expressed in Yen terms for the purpose of our analysis). This measure shows a high volatility for the four 
most heavily crisis-affected countries on the one hand (Thailand, Korea, Indonesia and Malaysia), and 
lower levels of volatility for the other five countries (Hong Kong, China, Singapore, Philippines and 
Taiwan). In an extension of the empirical analysis, we will examine if higher levels of volatility increase 
the  impact  of  platform  investment  status,  consistent  with  the  greater  real  option  value  of  platform 
investments under higher levels of uncertainty. 
                                                 
15 Right censoring is not an issue with discrete choice models such as the probit model.    18 
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To test Hypothesis 2, we include the variable size of country platform network, the number of 
countries (other than the country of the focal affiliate) in the Asian region in which the parent firm had 
manufacturing operation in 1995. Hypothesis 2 predicts a positive impact of size of country platform 
network, but only for focal affiliates that do not themselves serve as country platforms. We include the 
variable size of country platform network separately for platform and non-platform affiliates and expect an 
insignificant impact of the former and a positive impact for the latter.
16 We note that Table 2 also shows 
an important heterogeneity in the responses of Asian economies to the Asian financial crisis. Given the 
uncertainty concerning future developments and the likelihood of further divergence between countries, 
this suggests that the flexibility value of operating a network of country platforms in Asia has been 
substantial.  
In order to test Hypotheses 3 and 4 concerning the responsiveness to agglomeration, we adopt a 
two-step methodology. We estimate a location decision model for all affiliates in our sample: for each 
affiliate at its specific year of entry. In this first-step location choice model, we include the relevant 
agglomeration variables in addition to country controls. From this model we derive for each affiliate the 
elasticity of the location choice probability with respect to the agglomeration factors as a direct measure of 
responsiveness  to  agglomeration.  Hence,  the  methodology  is  to  examine  the  selection  impact  of 
agglomeration appropriately at the time of entry, while controlling for other factors affecting location 
choice.  
To examine the location choices, we use the widely used conditional logit model (e.g. Head et al, 
1995; Chang and Park, 2005), modeling the probability that a country is chosen from a set of countries as 
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Where  t s X ,  is a vector of location variables at entry time t with coefficients β , and  s θ  are location fixed 
effects.  t i X ,  is a vector of investor characteristics that are interacted with location variables to examine 
                                                 
16 We consider manufacturing platforms in other Asian countries as the most relevant for possible manufacturing 
relocation. In the information on divestments and relocations  we could assess, not one case  was discovered of 
relocation outside of Asia.    19 
the role of investor heterogeneity, with coefficients γ . The location fixed effects control for all relatively 
unchanging  country  characteristics,  such  as  geographic  location,  cultural  distance,  and  regulatory 
institutions,  that  play  a  role  in  the  general  attractiveness  of  countries  for  Japanese  manufacturing 
investments.  In  order  to  control  for  time-variant  location  factors  affecting  country  attractiveness,  we 
include in the model the value of foreign direct investment inflow to the country at the time of entry.
17 The 
variables of interest in the location model are Japanese investor agglomeration at entry (the number of 
Japanese  electronics  manufacturing  establishments  at  the  time  of  entry  of  the  affiliate)  and  Keiretsu 
investor agglomeration at entry (the number of electronics manufacturing establishments at the time of 
entry  established  by  firms  within  the  same  vertical  keiretsu).  If  investor  agglomeration  benefits  are 
important these two  variables  should  have a  positive  impact  on  location  choice.  As  discussed in the 
previous  section,  the  responses  to  Japanese  investor  and  keiretsu  investor  agglomeration  may  differ 
depending on investing firm characteristics. Earlier studies have found that smaller firms are much more 
responsive to Japanese agglomeration than larger firms (Shaver and Flyer, 2000; Belderbos and Carree, 
2002). To allow for this effect we add the interactive term of Japanese investor agglomeration at entry 
and  parent  firm  size  at  entry  (a  variable  of  the  form  t i X , ).
18 If  larger  firms  are  less  attracted  to 
agglomeration, the coefficients (of the form γ ) of the interactive term should be negative. In addition, we 
allow  for  heterogeneity  in  response  to  keiretsu  investor  agglomeration.  Here  the  existing  empirical 
evidence  strongly  suggest  that  member  firms  are  responsive  to  agglomeration  and  follow  foreign 
investments by the core firm, while core firms appear more involved in pioneering new locations without 
previous  keiretsu  establishments  (Belderbos  and  Carree,  2002;  Pugel  and  Kimura,  1996;  Smith  and 
Florida,  1994;  Head  et  al.,  1995).  We  therefore  include  Keiretsu  investor  agglomeration  at  entry 
interacted separately with dummy variables for member firm and for core firm.
  
The results of conditional logit analysis, shown in Table 3, conform to our expectations and earlier 
empirical results. Japanese investor agglomeration at entry is significantly positive while the interactive 
terms with parent size at entry is significantly negative, suggesting that agglomeration benefits are a more 
important factor in location decisions for smaller firms. Similarly, Keiretsu investor agglomeration at 
entry has a positive and significant impact for member firms as expected, but it has an insignificant effect 
                                                 
17 FDI inflow data are drawn from balance of payments statistics published by the IMF. Given the large variation in 
FDI values (ranging from zero to 37 billion dollars), we include the variable in logarithmic form after adding 1 
(million dollar) to each observation.  
18 We used back copies of Toyo Keizai’s Directory of Foreign Affiliates and firm directories published by Nihon 
Keizai Shimbun to establish previous entries by Japanese firms and historical parent employment data. Following 
earlier work (Belderbos and Carree, 2002; Shaver et al, 2000), we use employment as the indicator of firm size; 
historical employment data are also more readily available. We also tested for a possible interaction between host 
country cumulative experience of the parent firm at entry and agglomeration as suggested by Delios and Henisz 
(2000) and Chung and Song (2004), but found this variable to be insignificant, partly due to multicollinearity with 
the size interaction term.    20 
for core firms. The foreign direct investment inflow variable is positive and highly significant, while the 
country  fixed  effects  suggest that  no  country  has  been  a  significantly  more  attractive  destination  for 
Japanese  electronics  investments  than  China  (the  reference  country),  while  Hong  Kong,  Indonesia, 
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, have been significantly less attractive. 
 
Insert Table 3 
 
Hypotheses 3 and 4 imply that those affiliates, of which the location choice was particularly 
responsive to Japanese investor and keiretsu investor agglomeration, respectively, are more likely to be 
‘adversely  selected’  and  are  less  likely  to  survive.  We  can  now  operationalize  these  responsiveness 
measures directly by calculating an elasticity that measures the relative contribution of the agglomeration 
factor in the investment location decisions. We calculate for each affiliate the proportional change in the 
probability that the location was chosen with respect to a proportional change in agglomeration, taking 
into  account  the  estimated  heterogeneity  in  firm  responses.  The  elasticities  for  Japanese  investor 
agglomeration  at  entry  and  Keiretsu  investor  agglomeration  at  entry  are  calculated  as 
) ˆ 1 )( ( , , , , , t s i t i t s t s is P X X X R − + = γ β
) )
 where  is R  indicates  responsiveness  to  keiretsu  or  Japanese 
agglomeration,  a  hat  (^)  indicates  estimated  coefficients  and  t s X ,  are  the  agglomeration  variables.
19 





  The model includes an extensive set of control variables representing factors at the parent, affiliate, 
and host country level suggested to have a potential impact on divestment in earlier studies.  
 
Parent firm characteristics 
We include three parent control variables. Parent firm patent intensity (the number of US patents 
granted to the parent firm during 1993-1999 times 1000, divided by parent sales in 1995). Patent intensity 
proxies  for  competitive  advantages  based  on  advanced  technology  that  are  likely  to  increase  the 
probability of affiliate survival. Furthermore, we include parent size, and parent prior country experience. 
                                                 
19 E.g. See Greene (1997, p. 919); Head et al. (1995) and Chang and Park (2005) provide similar applications. 
20 In the responsiveness to keiretsu investor agglomeration measure we maintained the insignificant coefficient for 
core  firms.  Setting  the  insignificant  core  firm  coefficient  to  zero  generates  a  stronger  positive  impact  of 
responsiveness  in  the  divestment  analysis.  Similarly,  if  we  calculate  responsiveness  to  keiretsu  agglomeration 
separately for core firms and for member firms, the former is not significant while the latter is significantly positive 
in the divestment analysis.   21 
Parent size has been found to impact the probability of divestment positively (Li, 1995; Hennart et al., 
1998; Belderbos, 2003), but also negatively (Park and Park, 2000). On one hand, larger investing firms 
may  find  it  easier to  reach  a  withdrawal  decision  and  give  less  weight to  the  survival  of individual 
affiliates. However, a reverse argument also has appeal: larger firms have more financial or management 
resources and can exercise more patience for poorly performing affiliates. Parent size is the logarithm of 
parent firm sales in 1995.
21 Parent prior country experience (the number of affiliates established by the 
parent firm in the country prior to the establishment of the focal affiliate) captures that multinational firms 
can reduce their “liability of foreigness” by learning from prior experience in the host country. Previous 
studies have generally found a positive impact of host country experience on the probability of affiliate 




We include two control variables at the affiliate level, consistent with the entry and exit theory of 
Jovanovic (1982). Affiliate size (the logarithm of the number of employees of the affiliate in 1995
23) has 
been found to be positively associated with firm survival (Dunne et al, 1989; Mitchell, 1994; Mata et al, 
1995). Studies have also shown that this positive relationship between firm size and survival applies to 
foreign affiliates (e.g. Mata and Portugal, 2000; Li, 1995). Affiliate age (the number of years the affiliate 
has been in operation until 1995) is included to capture that newly established affiliates suffer more from 
“liability of newness”, while older affiliates have been able to improve their operations to adapt to host 
country conditions. Earlier evidence supports a positive relationship between firm age and firm or affiliate 
survival (e.g. Mitchell, 1994; Yamawaki, 1999; Benito, 1997; Shaver et al, 1997). On the other hand, 
evidence has also been found for the presence of a “liability of adolescence” (Hannan, 1998), with the 
probability of survival decreasing with age over a range of years (Mata and Portugal, 2002; Li, 1995). To 
accommodate a more complex relationship between age and divestment, we include the quadratic term as 
well as the linear term of affiliate age.  
The entry mode of the affiliate is also likely to impact divestment probabilities. We include three 
dummy variables with wholly owned greenfield affiliates as reference group: majority owned JV (dummy 
taking the value 1 if the affiliate is a joint venture in which the Japanese parent held a majority stake, 51-
95 percent), minority owned JV (dummy taking the value 1 if the affiliate is a joint venture in which the 
                                                 
21 We took the logarithmic term to reduce the large variation in parent firm sales in the sample, ranging from 285 
million Yen to more than 4000 billion Yen, and also because we expect a declining marginal impact at the larger 
firm sizes. A linear specification gives similar results though with a higher estimated standard error. The same 
approach was taken with affiliate employment. 
22 We also employed, as an alternative experience measure, the cumulative experience of the parent at the time of 
entry of the focal affiliate (number of previously established affiliates multiplied with each affiliate’s age), and found 
similar (insignificant) results as those reported in table 5. 
23 The dataset does not include reliable sales figures for all affiliates.   22 
Japanese parent held a minority or 50 percent stake), and acquired affiliate (dummy taking the value 1 if 
the affiliate was acquired by the Japanese parent).  
The last affiliate characteristic is its market orientation. Multinational firms have different motives 
for foreign affiliate establishments: they can use their foreign affiliates as a production base serving export 
markets, or to manufacture products serving, and often adapting to, the local market. Export-oriented 
affiliates established in Asia by Japanese electronic firms are often a vehicle to take advantage of the 
comparative advantages in these countries in terms of manufacturing costs. They may be more sensitive to 
changes in comparative advantages, and they tend to be less embedded in the local economy in terms of 
supplier and other linkages (Belderbos et al, 2001). Local-orient affiliates, in contrast, give more weight to 
local adaptation and are comparatively more integrated into local economy. Belderbos et al (2001) found 
evidence that foreign affiliates of Japanese firms that are local market oriented demonstrate more intensive 
backward linkages with local suppliers. Development of ties with local suppliers can be seen as country-
specific  assets  that  increase  local  capabilities  but  loose  their  value  once  the  firm  decides  to  divest, 
increasing exit costs (e.g. Song, 2002). Pan and Chi (1999) argue that local market oriented firms may 
perform better since they are more shielded from fierce competition on world markets, but found no 
evidence in a sample of foreign owned affiliates in China. We include two market orientation variables: 
Export orientation (dummy taking the value of 1 if all affiliate sales are on export markets), Mixed market 
orientation (dummy taking value of 1 if the affiliate sells on both the local and export markets). Affiliates 
that are only selling on the domestic market serve as the reference group.  
 
Country characteristics 
The analysis controls for the potential impact of Japanese investor agglomeration in 1995 (the 
number of manufacturing affiliates in the electronics value chain in operation in the country in 1995, 
excluding  those  affiliates  belonging  to  the  parent  firm  of  the  focal  affiliate).  With  the  measures  of 
responsiveness  to  Japanese  and  keiretsu  investor  agglomeration  controlling  for  the  impact  of 
agglomeration at the time of entry and possible adverse selection, this measure of current agglomeration 
can provide a more accurate estimate of relevant Japanese investor agglomeration externalities at the time 
we study divestments. The current agglomeration measure may have a negative effect on the probability 
of  divestment  due  to  the  beneficial  effects  of  agglomeration,  but  this  impact  may  be  mitigated  if 
agglomeration is associated with increased competition (e.g. Chung and Kalnins, 2001). We also include a 
measure of labor cost increase:  the percentage growth in wages (expressed in dollars) for manufacturing 
workers in the host country’s electronics industry between 1995 and 1998. In particular in an assembly 
industry  such  as  electronics,  labor  input  is  an  important  cost  factor  and  labor  cost  is  an  important 
determinant of the relative attractiveness of a location (e.g. Belderbos and Carree, 2002; Song, 2002). A   23 
third factor in location and divestment decisions is the growth of the local market. Market growth allows 
manufacturing  affiliates  to  grow  without  intensifying  competition  for  market  share,  reducing  the 
likelihood of divestment (e.g. Li, 1995; Benito, 1997). We include as a measure of the growth in the 
relevant market, the percentage growth in the dollar value of the country’s electronics market between 
1995 to 1998 (Electronics market growth). Finally, we include the average dollar value of annual inward 
direct  investment  flows  to  the  country  between  1995  to  1998  (FDI  inflow),  as  a  broad  measure  of 
attractiveness of the countries which should also pick up regulatory and other changes that impact the 
attractiveness of countries to FDI.
24 
Summary statistics for the dependent variable, operational measures and control variables are 
provided in table 4, and the correlation matrix is given in Appendix.  
 





The results of the Probit model relating the probability of manufacturing affiliate divestment to 
the operational measures and control variables are presented in the first column of table 5. The model is 
highly significant as indicated by the Chi-square test statistic. The coefficient of country platform affiliate 
has the expected sign (negative) but is not significant, which provides no support for Hypothesis 1.
25 The 
coefficient of the size of country platform network is positive and significant for affiliates that are not 
country platform affiliates, as predicted by Hypothesis 2. In further confirmation of Hypotheses 2, size of 
country  platform  network  has  no  significant  impact  for  country  platform  affiliates.  These  results  do 
indicate a major distinction between platform and non-platform affiliates, but through a differential effect 
of network size, rather than a direct effect of country platform status.
26. Hypotheses 3 and 4 are confirmed 
by the positive and significant coefficients of responsiveness to Japanese investor agglomeration at entry 
(at the 1 percent level) and responsiveness to Keiretsu investor agglomeration at entry (significant just 
below the 5 percent level). Affiliates for which the keiretsu and Japanese agglomeration factor was of 
                                                 
24 The number of country variables that can be included in the analysis is limited due to the fact that the analysis 
covers a cross section of only nine Asian countries, causing multicollinearity in extended specifications. Adding 
various other variables, such as GDP per capita growth or GDP growth, provide results similar to the electronics 
demand growth factor.  
25 We use conservative two-sided tests throughout. 
26 One reason for this finding is that the combination of Hypotheses 1 and 2 require both a slope and a shift effect of 
platform investment status, which leads to a relatively high degree of multicollinearity between the network size 
variable for platforms and the platform dummy variable.    24 
greater importance in determining the location decision were significantly less likely to survive in the 
period of investigation (1995-1998), in support of the “adverse selection” argument. 
 
Insert Table 5  
 
Control variables 
The estimated coefficients of the control variables are largely consistent with perceived theory and 
results in previous empirical studies. Parent size is negative and significant, while both parent firm patent 
intensity and parent prior country experience has the expected negative sign but do not reach conventional 
significance levels. Consistent with earlier studies, larger affiliates are less likely to be divested (the 
coefficient of affiliate size is negative and significant at 10% level). Minority owned joint ventures, but 
not majority owned joint ventures, have a greater probability of divestment than wholly owned greenfield 
affiliates, consistent with the impact of equity stake on affiliate survival found in Dhanaraj and Beamish 
(2004). The coefficient for acquired affiliate is positive but not significant.
27 Divestment is related to 
affiliate age in an inverted U-shape manner. The probability of divestment increases with age up to a 
certain point and then starts to decrease. These results are more in line with the view that age can be a 
liability due to organizational rigidity (e.g. Hannan, 1998) than with an organizational learning view. 
Older affiliates may still rely on mature technologies or focus on markets with less growth potential, and 
in dynamic markets with rapid technological developments such as electronics, age is not necessarily an 
advantage (Li, 1995).
28 The export orientation dummy has a positive sign, but the coefficient just does not 
reach conventional significance levels, while the mixed market orientation dummy is also positive but 
insignificant. 
Of  the  country  variables  Japanese  agglomeration  in  1995  has  a  negative  sign  and  is  highly 
significant, indicating that the benefits of Japanese agglomeration dominate over potential competition 
increasing  effects,  once  the  indirect  impact  through  adverse  selection  is  accounted  for.  Of  the  other 
country variables, labor cost increase has a positive and significant impact on divestment. The coefficient 
of electronics market growth, on the other hand, has a counter-intuitive positive sign but is not significant. 
The same applies to the variable FDI inflow. Apparently, labor costs are the dominant consideration for 
location and survival of electronics plants in the Asian electronics industry.
29  
                                                 
27 We note that the number of acquisitions is small in this sample of electronics investments in Asia. We identified 
only five acquisitions, which does not allow to estimate the impact of this type of entry mode with precision. 
28 The coefficients indicate that for the larger majority of affiliates, the probability of divestment increases with age, 
as the turning point is only reached at 35 years. We note, however, that caution should be exercised in interpreting 
these coefficients, as the findings may be influenced by left censoring in our sample. 
29 Complicating the estimation of the impacts of labour cost and demand increases are the exchange rate changes 
(depreciations and devaluations) for several Asian countries during the period, which reduced both labour costs and   25 
 
Volatility and Uncertainty 
As shown in the previous section, the systematic changes in macroeconomic circumstances in the 
Asian  region  due  to  the  Asian  financial  crisis  during  the  period  of  investigation  1995-1998  led  to 
systematic uncertainty concerning future exchange rate changes, inflation, and economies’ capacity to 
recover. This systematic uncertainty related to a regional shock such as the Asian financial crisis is less 
likely to be well reflected in conventional measures of uncertainty such as variance of exchange rates. 
Nevertheless, the figures on the nine Asian countries suggest that there were important differences in 
macroeconomic  developments,  in  particular  real  exchange  rate  movements  and  volatility.  Following 
earlier work on foreign investment and real options (e.g. Kouvelis et al, 2001), we took the variance of the 
monthly  real  exchange  rate  of  the  local  currency  against the  Yen  during  1995-1998  as  an  imperfect 
measure of country-specific uncertainty. We grouped the countries into low volatility and high volatility 
countries, as the data suggested a relatively clear distinction here.
30 In an extended model we tested the 
hypotheses that country platform affiliates are less likely to be divested in high volatility countries, and 
that for platform investments in high volatility countries there is an even stronger mitigated impact of 
network size. We include the country platform affiliate dummy and the size of country platform network 
(for platform affiliates) variable separately for high and low volatility countries. The empirical results are 
reported in the second column of table 5. Platform affiliate status has a negative and significant impact on 
divestment for high volatility countries, but not for low volatility ones. High or low volatility does not 
matter for the impact of country platform network size: both terms are insignificant, while the impact for 
non-country platforms remains robustly positive and significant. These results provide further evidence of 
the significance of the real options and network flexibility explanation of foreign affiliate divestments. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
 
We  analyzed  divestment  decisions  in  a  comprehensive  sample  of  1078  Japanese  electronics 
manufacturing affiliates in operation in 1995 in nine Asian countries during the years leading up and into 
                                                                                                                                                              
market demand in dollar terms, and introduce a positive correlation between the two variables. We could also expect 
that export oriented firms are more sensitive to changes in labor cost than domestic market oriented firms. Indeed, a 
test including the interaction effect of exporting affiliates and labor cost growth produced a significantly positive 
coefficient. Interacting domestic market orientation with market growth resulted in the expected negative sign but the 
interaction effect was not significant.  
30 Interacting the exchange rate volatility measure as such with the platform dummy produced an expected negative, 
but  insignificant  effect,  suggesting  that  the  moderating  impact  of  volatility  is  not  well  captured  by  a  linear 
relationship.  We  also  added  a  separate  interaction  term  for  the  highest  volatility  country  (Indonesia)  with  the 
platform dummy: this term similarly was negative but not significant. Other results remained robust.   26 
the  Asian  financial  crisis  (1995-1998).  The  empirical  results  gave  broad  support  for  a  real  options 
perspective on divestments, as well as for the notion that foreign investor agglomeration leads to ‘adverse 
selection’ by attracting weakly competitive firms.  
Affiliates  with  ‘country  platform’  status,  i.e.  those  affiliates  that  are  the  sole  manufacturing 
presence of a firm in a country, were less likely to be divested if located in countries characterized by high 
economic  uncertainty,  indicated  by  real  exchange  rate  volatility.  Affiliates  that  did  not  have  country 
platform status (they were one among multiple manufacturing affiliates operated by the firm in the country) 
had greater odds of divestment if the parent firm operated a larger network of manufacturing platforms in 
different Asian countries, and so could exercise broader relocation and flexibility options in response to 
differential macroeconomic developments. The results are consistent with the notion that a network of 
manufacturing  plants  provides  option  value  to  the  firm,  by  providing  the  flexibility  to  adjust  the 
distribution  of  manufacturing  operations  over  locations  under  conditions  of  uncertainty  concerning 
exchange  rates,  labor  cost,  and  market  conditions  (Kogut  and  Kulatilaka,  1994a;  Pennings  and 
Sleuwaegen,  2000).  The  findings  provide  evidence  that  multinational  firms  both  maintain  flexibility 
options through operating a multinational plant network of platform affiliates in multiple Asian countries, 
and exercise this flexibility option through divestments and relocations of manufacturing activities that do 
not provide additional flexibility value. The results suggest that affiliate divestment decisions should be 
considered in the context of wider multinational firm strategy and their position in international plant 
networks, rather than as separate decisions, as has been the approach in most previous work on foreign 
divestments.  
The  role  of  foreign  investor  agglomeration  in  affiliate  divestment  is  a  complex  one,  and  we 
attempted to bring more clarity in this relationship by investigating the potential impact of agglomeration 
through the process of ‘adverse selection’: the notion that the most competitive firms are less attracted to 
agglomerated  areas  as  they  are  more  likely  to  contribute  to  agglomeration  externalities  benefiting 
competing firms, rather than benefiting from such externalities themselves. Earlier studies provided strong 
confirmation that Japanese investor agglomeration attracts further Japanese investments, a pattern that is 
particularly  visible  for  member  firms  in  vertical  business  groups  (keiretsu).  We  used  a  two-step 
methodology to analyze the impact of adverse selection, examining the determinants of location choice at 
the time entry of the affiliates with a first-step conditional logit model. From this model we could derive 
direct indicators of potential adverse selection due to Japanese and vertical business group agglomeration 
at entry as the elasticity of the location choice probability with respect to agglomeration at entry measures. 
The results of the conditional logit analysis replicated earlier findings in the location and agglomeration 
literature of a major impact of Japanese and keiretsu agglomeration on location choice. The analysis also 
confirmed  a  substantial  firm  heterogeneity  in  the  response  to  agglomeration  depending  on  investor   27 
characteristics. Larger firms were less attracted to agglomerations, while vertical keiretsu member firms, 
but not leading core firms of the group, were attracted to keiretsu agglomeration. The divestment analysis 
confirmed that those affiliates of which the location choice at entry was more responsive to Japanese and 
keiretsu agglomeration, were more likely to be divested, suggested that adverse selection indeed plays a 
role in divestment patterns among Japanese firms.  
The divestment analysis at the same time showed that affiliates operating in 1995 in countries with 
a substantial Japanese affiliate presence were less likely to be divested. This positive impact on survival of 
current  Japanese  investor  agglomeration  is  consistent  with  the  presence  of  important  Japanese  firm 
agglomeration externalities (e.g. Belderbos and Carree, 2002; Head et al, 1995). The positive impact 
contrasts with earlier results (e.g. Shaver and Flyer, 2000; Kim and Delios, 2003), where a negative 
impact of Japanese investor agglomeration on firm survival was found and subsequently attributed to a 
higher intensity of competition associated with this agglomeration. Our results suggest that the paradox 
between a strong attraction of agglomerated areas to foreign investors and the largely negative impact of 
agglomeration on firm survival found in previous empirical work may well be due to a failure to control 
for  adverse  selection  effects.  In  our  study,  by  exploring  firm  heterogeneity  in  the  response  to 
agglomeration and by distinguishing agglomeration at the year of entry from agglomeration during the 
period in which divestments are examined, we could distinguish the adverse selection effect associated 
with agglomeration from the direct impact of agglomeration. After controlling for the impact of adverse 
selection,  an  indicator  of  agglomeration  is  likely  to  bring  out  the  real  net  effect  of  agglomeration 
externalities and increased competition.
31 In this regard, our approach and results echo the findings in 
Shaver (1998) that one has to control for endogeneity of strategic choices of firms in analyzing the impact 
of these choices on firm performance. Location strategy, as it is influenced by agglomeration, is dependent 
on  the  firms’  competitive  resources.  Failure  to  control  for  this  endogeneity  of  location  choice  may 
incorrectly  attribute  divestment  to  a  direct  (competition)  impact  of  agglomeration,  rather  than  to  the 
underlying firm characteristics that governed the location choice. 
Our findings on the contrasting impact of keiretsu agglomeration for core firms and members firms 
are in line with those obtained by Kim et al. (2004), to the extent that the most powerful members of 
keiretsu (cf. the core firms) distinguish themselves by pursuing independent location strategies to increase 
geographic scope. The results contribute to the discussion concerning the efficiency and performance 
enhancing or competition reducing impact of horizontal and vertical keiretsu (e.g. Miwa and Ramseyer, 
                                                 
31 However, we note that differences in results of the present and earlier studies may be partly due to the scope of the 
industry cluster under consideration, since our definition of the broad electronics industry included material and 
component  suppliers  as  well  as  final  goods  manufacturers.  Hence,  the  direct  competition  effect  of  ‘like’  firms 
competing  in  the  same  market  segment  is  likely  to  be  of  less  importance  compared  with  the  benefits  of 
agglomeration such as the provision of specialized high quality inputs, information spillovers, and the availability of 
skilled labor (c.f. Chung and Kalnins, 2001).   28 
2002). Hundley and Jacobson (1998) found mixed export performance effects of keiretsu membership, 
and suggested that preferential intra-group trading may shield firms from competitive pressures, reducing 
performance. Weinstein and Yafeh (1995) found keiretsu firms to engage in overinvestment financed by 
the main bank, which led to significantly reduced profitability of keiretsu firms compared to independent 
firms. Our results similarly suggest that vertical keiretsu presence in foreign countries, although it can 
allow for transfer of efficient Japanese business practices such as just-in-time delivery systems and quality 
control (e.g. Martin et al. 1995; 1998; Smith and Florida, 1994), also involves ‘overinvestment’ by weakly 
competitive member firms that have lower survival chances in the longer term.  
Our  results  reconfirm  the  need  for  countries  to  attract  major  investors  in  order  to  generate 
agglomeration benefits sustaining incoming investments flows, but suggest a qualification. Investment 
agglomeration  also  attracts  lower  quality  investments  that  are  associated  with  higher  divestment  and 
turbulence in agglomerated areas. Another policy implication is that containing labor cost increases may 
be an important means to avoid foreign divestment and relocations. The depreciation of Asian currencies 
with the  Asian financial  crisis  was associated  with substantial  declines in real  wage  costs  in  several 
ASEAN countries, and our results suggest that the crisis has led multinational firms to maintain, rather 
than divest, manufacturing operations. 
 
Limitations and Further Research 
A limitation of this study is the restriction of our sample to Japanese affiliates in the (broadly 
defined)  electronics  sector  in  Asia,  which  reduces  the  scope  for  generalizations.  The  existence  of 
extensive plant networks by multinational firms in different countries, the importance of labor costs, and 
the ‘footloose’ nature of electronics assembly plants, are to an extent particular to assembly industries 
such  as  the  electronics  industry.  The  role  of  vertical  industrial  groups  and  suppliers  networks  is 
particularly important in the industrial organization of Japanese firms. Hence, it would be of interest to 
investigate to what extent similar systematic patterns of divestment occur in other industries and for 
affiliates  owned  by  multinationals  based  in  other  countries.  An  interesting  setting  would  be  foreign 
divestment by South Korean firms, where agglomeration and group affiliation have similarly been found 
to impact investment decisions (e.g. Guillen, 2002). Second, our analysis of divestment only covered a 
time span of 4 years. This was a proper setting for our analysis, as this was a period of major uncertainty 
concerning  exchange  rate  changes  and  market  performance  in  Asia,  during  which  divestments  and 
relocation became a common phenomenon. A longitudinal analysis of affiliates' survival probabilities by 
extending the time period of analysis would however have important benefits. It would allow use of 
survival models to investigate the dynamic impact of agglomeration and plant networks on divestment,   29 
and would introduce spell variation in the dependent variable and time variation in the covariates.
32 An 
extension of the analysis would also provide further insights into the reaction of multinational firms to the 
Asian  financial  crisis  and  its  aftermath,  and  could  allow  derivation  of  time-variant  country-specific 
uncertainty indicators impacting the option value of country platforms (cf. Kouvelis et al. 2001, Pennings 
and Sleuwaegen, 2000).  
Another  avenue  for  future  research  is  to  analyze  the  impact  of  agglomeration  economies  and 
competition effects in more detail. A possible improvement of the analysis would be to estimate the 
impact of agglomeration at the level of regions rather than countries. This will allow for more accurate 
measurement of relevant agglomeration and labor costs at the regional level, which is of importance in 
particular  for  the  growing  number  of  affiliates  established  in  the  various  regions  of  China.
33 Further 
insights could also be obtained by differentiation of the type of agglomerated establishments (e.g. Chung 
and Kalnins, 2001) with an expected diverging impact on affiliate survival. There may be differences 
between affiliates established by firms with the same country of origin, affiliates under other foreign 
ownership,  and  domestic  firms.  Agglomeration  economies  should  dominate  competition  effects  for 
affiliates further in the value chain but not for directly competing firms. In the context of the electronics 
industry, a first distinction could be made between component suppliers and final goods producers. These 
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Table 1: Distribution by country of overseas plants and divestment 
 
Host countries 
or  regions 
Manufacturing affiliates in 1995  Divested affiliates: 
1995 - early 1999 
  Number  Share in total 
% 





China  237  21.99%  16  16.49%  6.75% 
Hong Kong  45  4.17%  7  7.22%  15.56% 
Indonesia  58  5.38%  2  2.06%  3.45% 
Korea  98  9.09%  14  14.43%  14.29% 
Malaysia  228  21.15%  11  11.34%  4.82% 
Philippines  35  3.25%  3  3.09%  8.57% 
Singapore  126  11.69%  24  24.74%  19.05% 
Thailand  108  10.02%  2  2.06%  1.85% 
Taiwan  143  13.27%  18  18.56%  12.59% 
Total  1078  100%  97  100%  9.00% 
   35 
Table 2: Heterogeneous responses to the crisis and macroeconomic developments (1995-1998) 
 
Major indicators  CH  HK  ID  MA  PH  SG  KR  TH  TW 
                   
Labor cost growth  
(current prices, in 
USD) 
38.2% 30.0% -63.3% 19.4% -31.9% 12.4% -30.8% -51.3% -11.3%
Real GDP growth  
(local currency)  30.7% 4.6% 13.6% 11.7% 15.5% 15.0% 9.3% -7.1% 21.7%
Consumer price 
increase  4.3% 12.2% 96.7% 15.7% 24.3% 0.3% 12.1% 17.6% 5.7%
Change in nominal 
exchange rate against 
Yen 
15.7% 14.8% -65.4% -23.2% -22.5% -1.7% -27.0% -20.2% -3.0%
Exchange rate 
volatility: (variance of 
the monthly real 
exchange rate of local 
currency against Yen) 
68.7 93.0 3528.6 164.6 90.8 23.7 339.7 215.6 22.2
 
Notes: CH=China; HK=Hong Kong; ID=Indonesia;  MA=Malaysia; PH=Philippines; SG=Singapore; 
KR=Korea;TH=Thailand; TW=Taiwan; Data sources: UNIDO, ILO, IMF, World Bank.   36 
 
Table 3: Conditional logit Estimates of Affiliate Location Choice Model 
 
















































Taiwan  0.0188 
  [0.1778] 
   
Chi Square  602.04*** 
Pseudo-R2  0.1271 
Log likelihood  -2067.6 
Number of choices        9 
Number of choice observations  1078 
Notes: *, **, *** indicate significant at the 10, 5, 1 percent level, respectively (two-tailed test); 
standard errors in parentheses. PR China is the reference location.   37 
 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics of dependent and explanatory variables 
Name  Description  Mean  Stdev  Hypothesis: 
sign 
Divestment  binary variable denoting if the affiliate is divested or not 
between early 1995 and early 1999  0.09  0.29   
Country platform 
affiliate 
dummy taking the value 1 if the affiliate is the only 
manufacturing affiliate of its parent in the country in 1995  0.55  0.50  H1: - 
Size of country 
platform network 
the number of countries in the Asian region in which the 
parent firm had manufacturing operation in 1995 (other 
than the country of the focal affiliate) 
2.92  2.40 
H2: + 







the elasticity of the location choice probability with 
respect to Japanese investor agglomeration at entry 
(calculated from the location choice model) 





the elasticity of the location choice probability with 
respect to keiretsu investor agglomeration at entry 
(calculated from the location choice model) 
0.05  0.11  H4: + 
Parent firm Patent 
intensity 
Number of US patents granted to the parent firm during 
1993-1999 times 1000, divided by parent sales in 1995  0.89  1.50   
Parent size  the logarithm of parent firm sales (million Yen) in 1995  11.13  2.36   
Parent prior 
country experience 
the number of manufacturing affiliates established by the 
parent firm in the country prior to the entry of the focal 
affiliate. 
0.82  1.78   
Affiliate size  the logarithm of the number of employees of the affiliate 
in 1995  5.65  1.41   
Affiliate age  the number of years the affiliate has been in operation 
until 1995  8.92  8.04   
Majority owned JV 
dummy taking the value 1 if the affiliate is a joint venture 
in which the Japanese parent holds a majority stake (51 - 
95 percent) 
0.24  0.43   
Minority owned JV 
dummy taking the value 1 if the affiliate is a joint venture 
in which the Japanese parent holds a minority or 50 
percent stake 
0.30  0.46   
Acquired affiliate  dummy taking the value 1 if the affiliate was acquired by 
the parent firm  0.00  0.07   
Export orientation  dummy variable taking the value of 1 if all affiliate sales 
are on export markets  0.27  0.44   
Mixed market 
orientation 
dummy variable taking value of 1 if the affiliate sells on 




the number of Japanese manufacturing affiliates in the 
electronics value chain in operation in the country in 
1995, excluding those affiliates belonging to the parent 
firm of the focal affiliate 
202.27  86.81   
Labor cost increase 
the percentage growth in annual wages (expressed in 
dollars) for manufacturing workers in the host country’s 
electronics industry between 1995 and 1998 
0.01  0.33   
Electronics Market 
growth 
the percentage growth in the dollar value of the country’s 
electronics market between 1995 to 1998  0.08  0.37   
FDI inflow  average annual inward direct investment flows to the 
country between 1995 to 1998 in billion dollars  13.28  15.76     38 













Country platform affiliate (high volatility countries)    -0.7016 
 
  [0.2748]** 
 
Country platform affiliate (low volatility countries)    -0.0452 
 
  [0.2257] 
 
Size of country platform network (non-platform affiliates)  0.1049  0.1056 
 
[0.0500]**  [0.0491]** 
 





Size of country platform network    0.1149 
                    ( for platform affiliates in high volatility countries)    [0.0885] 
 
Size of country platform network    0.0333 
                     (for platform affiliates in low volatility countries)    [0.0696] 
 
Responsiveness to Japanese investor agglomeration at entry  1.2454  1.2129 
 
[0.6496]*  [0.6425]* 
 
Responsiveness to keiretsu investor agglomeration at entry  1.2997  1.249 
 
[0.4957]***  [0.5125]** 
 
Parent firm patent intensity  -0.0531  -0.0612 
 
[0.0415]  [0.0430] 
 
Parent size  -0.1182  -0.1208 
 
[0.0588]**  [0.0571]** 
 
Parent prior country experience  -0.0577  -0.0615 
 
[0.0537]  [0.0574] 
 
Affiliate size  -0.0806  -0.0666 
 
[0.0492]*  [0.0513] 
 
Affiliate age  0.0798  0.0682 
 
[0.0326]**  [0.0333]** 
 
Affiliate age (squared)  -0.0023  -0.0021 
 
[0.0011]**  [0.0011]* 
 
   39 








Minority owned JV  0.3566  0.3684 
 
[0.1399]**  [0.1417]*** 
 
Majority owned JV  -0.1031  -0.1031 
 
[0.1702]  [0.1711] 
 
Acquired affiliate  0.6608  0.6851 
 
[0.6294]  [0.6629] 
 
Export orientation  0.2678  0.2617 
 
[0.1749]  [0.1748] 
 
Mixed market orientation  0.1194  0.0937 
 
[0.1499]  [0.1498] 
 
Japanese investor agglomeration in 1995  -0.004  -0.003 
 
[0.0012]***  [0.0013]** 
 
Labor cost increase  0.6756  0.4259 
 
[0.2952]**  [0.2884] 
 
Electronics Market growth  0.1437  -0.2838 
 
[0.3206]  [0.3699] 
 
FDI inflow  0.0065  0.0093 
 
[0.0097]  [0.0096] 
 
Constant  0.1822  0.0416 
  [0.7007]  [0.7041] 
     
Pseudo R2  0.145  0.155 
Number of observations  1078  1078 
Chi Square  89.28***  96.49*** 
Log likelihood  -278.7  -275.5 
Notes: *, **, *** indicate significant at the 10, 5, 1 percent level, respectively (two-tailed test); Huber-White-
Sandwich robust standard errors in parentheses. Wholly owned Greenfield and local market orientation are the 
references groups. 
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